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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
v. : 
Appeals Court No. 890118-CA 
JANERO D. ROMERO, : District Court No. 19128 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. That the state failed to provide exculpatory evidence 
to Defendant. 
2. That the prosecution knowingly used false and perjured 
testimony. 
3. That the Court erred in denying Appellantfs motion for 
new trial. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment, 
states: 
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, with actual 
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall a 
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process in law; nor shall private property be taken for 
a public use, without just compensation." 
The Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 
7, provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This is an appeal taken from a finding of guilt of the 
Appellant in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for 
Weber County, State of Utah. Said trial took place on October 
6, 1988. (Record, page 46) 
2. That the alleged crime occurred on or about the 1st 
day of September, 1988, in Ogden, Utah, Weber County, State of 
Utah. (Record, page 1) 
3. That the Appellant was arrested for the crime of 
distribution of a controlled substance. (Record, page 1) 
4. That Appellant's residence was searched pursuant to a 
search warrant. (Transcript, page 63, lines 4 through 7) 
5. That the Affidavit for Search Warrant stated that a 
confidential informant had purchased cocaine from resident 
located at 3460 Grant Avenue. (See, Affidavit of Search 
Warrant, attached) 
6. That subsequent to the hearing, the Appellant learned 
that the confidential informant had prepared a report of the 
sale of Cocaine on the 31st of August wherein the confidential 
informant described the house as one with red brick and yellow 
trim. (Record, page 77) 
7. Said report was the basis for the search warrant on 
Appellant's residence. (Record, page 80) 
8. That at the time of trial the confidential informant 
pointed out a picture of the Appellant's house which does not 
have yellow trim. (Record, page 77) 
2 
9. That the prosecutor in closing arguments argued that 
even if the Appellant merely knew that someone else had cocaine 
in the house he could found guilty of simple possession. 
(Transcript, page 65, lines 8 through 11) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE STATE WITHHELD ITS EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE FROM 
THE DEFENSE AND THEREFORE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A 
REVERSAL OF CONVICTION. 
A written report by the confidential informant, Shauna 
Mains, is exculpatory in nature in that it describes a house 
where the confidential informant, Shauna Mains, saw her contact 
enter and buy the drugs which were the basis of the search 
warrant in this case. This house does not fit the description 
of the Appellantfs house and therefore said report not only goes 
to whether or not drugs were purchased from the Appellant or 
from the Appellant's house but also as to the credibility of 
Shauna Mains. 
In State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Ut. 198k), the court 
held that: 
"Neither the prosecutor nor officers workilng on a case 
may withhold exculpatory evidence or evidqnce valuable 
to a Defendant. " 
The evidence withheld in this case is exculpatory and is 
valuable to the Defendant, particularly in light of the fact 
that said report goes directly to the validity of the search 
warrant in this case, wherein the affiant of the search warrant, 
Doug Guard, based his information upon the credibility of the 
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confidential informant, Shauna Mains. In United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 82 L.Ed. 677, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court held as follows: 
"Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy 
if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was 
mislead by information in an affidavit that the affiant 
would have known was false except for his reckless 
disregard of the truth." 
In this case, the affidavit states that drug purchases were 
made at the request of the confidential informant and that the 
confidential informant purchased four grams of cocaine from the 
residence located at 3460 Grant Avenue, Ogden, Utah, which is 
the Appellant's address but in reviewing the report by Shauna 
Mains and the facts presented at trial wherein she identified 
the Appellant's house which does not match the description in 
her report, it is clear that the evidence submitted in the 
search warrant is false and the officer should have known said 
evidence was false except for his reckless disregard for the 
truth, and therefore, said search may have been illegal and the 
evidence withheld from the Appellant would have allowed him to 
challenge the validity of the search prior to trial. 
It is not an element for the Court to consider whether the 
prosecution acted in good faith or bad faith in this case or 
whether the prosecuting attorney withheld the evidence or if it 
was the police officers who withheld the evidence from the 
Appellant. In State v. Shabata, infra, the Court held that "for 
purposes of this question of good or bad faith the prosecutor is 
irrelevant. 'If the suppression of evidence results in 
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constitutional error, it is because of the character of the 
evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.'11 The Court went 
on further to hold that "information known to police officers 
working on a case is charged to the prosecution since the 
officers are part of the prosecution team." 
POINT II. 
THAT THE TESTIMONY OF SHAUNA MAINS CONSTITUTED KNOWING 
USE OF PERJURED TESTIMONY AND THEREFORE APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
The testimony of Shauna Mains, when she pointed out the 
appellant's house in a picture at trial, stated that the 
Appellant's house is the house where drugs were purchased by her 
contact and that she saw her contact enter that house is false 
and perjured testimony in that her report states that the house 
she saw her contact ^nter was red brick'with vellov-trim-
(Record, page 80) 
In State v. Shabata, infra, the Court held that if the 
prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony it would violate 
the Defendant's right to due process under the Constitutions of 
the United States and Utah "if there is any reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury." The Court went on to infer that "this is 
true even if the state did not intentionally solicit the false 
evidence, but merely allows it to go uncorrected when it 
appears." 
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In this case, the state did intentionally solicit the false 
testimony, and the good faith of the prosecutor is not at issue 
in that Shauna Mains was a police agent, working as a 
confidential informant for the police and officers of the police 
department, who are members of the prosecution team, knew that 
she had made a previous report describing a different house. 
There is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 
could have affected the judgment of the jury in that it went 
directly to whether or not the appellant made sales of drugs or 
had any drugs in the house prior to the search, and further, it 
goes to whether or not the search warrant in itself was valid. 
If the state knew that testimony was false the state has a 
duty to correct said testimony. State v. Shabata, infra. In 
this case the state did not make any attempt to correct said 
testimony and therefore the jury was mislead by said testimony. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR WAS 
IMPROPER, IN THAT THE PROSECUTOR INCORRECTLY STATED 
THE LAW TO THE JURY WHICH COULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE 
CONVICTION OF THE APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF POSSESSION 
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
The prosecutor stated: "If this doesn't convict him, you 
have the lesser included in there is simple possession. Based 
upon the Appellant's testimony, which he denied, "I told Tracy 
to get it out of the house last week. I don't know, if you are 
going to give him credit for that, then I suppose -- then you 
can find him guilty of simple possession, because he wouldn't be 
possessing the stuff to sell." 
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Said statement is a misstatement of the law in that the 
Court in the case of State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Ut. 1985) 
stated; 
"Actual physical possession presupposes knowing and 
intentional possession. However, actual physical 
possession is not necessary to convict a Defendant of 
possession of a controlled substance, A conviction 
may also be based on constructive possession. 
Constructive possession exists where the contraband 
is subject to the Defendant's dominion and control. 
However, persons who might know of the whereabouts of 
the illicit drugs and who might even have access to 
them, but who have no intent to obtain and use the 
drugs cannot be convicted of possession of the 
controlled substance. Knowledge and ability to 
possess to not equal possession where there is no 
evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and 
ability. To find that a Defendant had constructive 
possession of a drug or other contraband, it is 
necessary to prove that there was a sufficient nexus 
between the accused and the drug to permit an inference 
that the accused had both the power and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the drug. Whether 
a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug 
exists depends upon the facts and circumstance of each 
case. Ownership and/or occupancy of the premises upon 
which the drugs are found, although are important 
factors, are not alone sufficient to establish 
constructive possession, especially when occupancy is 
not exclusive." 
In this case the dominion and control of the property was 
not exclusive in that the Appellant's two daughters resided with 
him and one daughter Tracy Florez, stated that she was the one 
that had the dominion and control over the cocaine. 
(Transcript, page 181, lines 14 through 25) 
In the case of State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Ut. 1986), 
the Court set forth the test to determine whether or not the 
prosecutor's remarks in closing argument warrant reversal. This 
two-prong test is as follows: 
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"(1) Did the remarks call to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they could not properly consider 
in determining their verdict, and (2) were the jurors 
under the circumstances of the particular case probably 
influenced by those remarks." 
In this case the remarks did call to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they could not properly consider in that 
the prosecutor told them that "based upon the Defendant's 
testimony, which he denies, fI told Tracy to get it out of the 
house last week.1 I don't know, if you are going to give him 
credit for that, then I suppose -- then you can find him guilty 
of simple possession, because he wouldn't be possessing the 
stuff to sell." This statement by the prosecutor misstates the 
law as set forth in State v. Fox, infra, and draws to jury's 
attention to the fact that they could find him guilty of 
possession even if he did not actually possess the drugs or 
constructively possess said drugs but that they were in the 
possession of Tracy Florez. 
Further, the jurors were probably influenced by these 
remarks in that they found the Appellant guilty of possession of 
a controlled substance and not possession with the intent to 
distribute a controlled substance. But for these remarks by the 
prosecutor there is a significant likelihood that the jury would 
have found him not-guilty in that it appears that the jury did 
believe Tracy Florez when she said the drugs were hers and 
disbelieved the officers and the confidential informant that the 
Appellant was selling drugs. 
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CONCLUSION 
The conviction of the Appellant should be reversed and the 
matter remanded to the District Court for new trial based upon 
the fact that the Appellant was not given exculpatory evidence 
and said evidence was not only exculpatory in nature but also 
goes to the validity of the search and that the prosecutor made 
improper closing arguments. 
DATED this l~2— day of July, 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have mailed 4 true and correct 
copies of the above BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT to Paul Van 
Dam, Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, via First-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this / <2~— 
day of July, 1989. 
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IN THE Circuit COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The udersigned being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
Thai affiani has reason to believe 
That ( # the person (s) of A l l o c c u p a n t s o f 3460 G r a n t A v e . 
( £ on the premises known as 34 60 G r a n t Avenue 
( ) in the vehicle(s) described as 
In the City of Og_deji County of Weber, State of Utah, there is now certain 
property or evidence described as: 
Narcotics 
Records of the sales of Narcotics 
Monies from the sale of Narcotics 
Equipment used for the sale of Narcotics 
and that said property 011 evidence: 
(X was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
X ) has been used or is possessed with the purpose of being used to commit or conceal the 
commission of an offense. 
00 is evidence of illegal conduct. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: On August 2 6 t h 1988 your 
affiant received information from a confidential informant that a large 
quantity of narcotics had been received in the Ogden area. The confident-
ial informant received this information from a source v/ho stated he had 
access to this shipment. Within the last 72 hours your affiant through 
the use of this confidential informant purchased approximately 4 grams 
of cocaine from the residence located at 3460 Grant Avenue. Your affiant 
also received information that the residence located at 3460 Grant Avenue 
is where the shipment of narcotics was received. On August 31st, 1988 
your affiant conducted a surveillance of 3460 Grant Avenue. A high 
volume of traffic was observed with the vehicles and occupants remaining 
for short periods of time. Your affiant believes the short term vehicle 
traffic is a characteristic of the sale of narcotics. Your affiant 
has been a police officer for 12 years, has attended numerous schools 
related to narcotics and is currently working as a undercover agent for th 
Weber/Morgan Narcotics Strike Force. 
Further grounds for issuance of a search warrant are attached hereto and are incorporated herein. 
(See attachment(s) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR St ARCH W ARRIN T 
PBQ* Two 
Your affiant considers the information from the confidential informant reliable because The c o n f i d e n t i a l 
i n f o r m a n t h a s been used numerous t i m e s i n t h e p a s t and h a s o b t a i n e d 
numerous s u c c e s s f u l a r r e s t s and c o n v i c t i o n s on n a r c o t i c s c a s e s f o r 
your a f f i a n t . 
The following information corroborates the facts given by the confidential informant Y o u r a f f l a n t 
conducted a surveillance of 3460 Grant Avenue and observed a high volune 
of short term traffic. Your affiant believes this is one characteristic 
of a residence where the sale of narcotics is taking place. 
WHEREF i »Rf the affiant prays that a Search Warrant issue for the seizure of said items 
( ) in the daytime 
()0 at any time day or night because there is reason to believe 
it is necessary to seize the property prior to it being concealed, 
destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reasons as follows 
It is further requested the officer executing the requested warrant not be required to give notice of his 
authority or purpose because 
()f the property sought may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted 
(}Q physical harm may result to any person if notice were given This danger is believed to 
exist because N a r c o t i c s d e a l e r s o f t e n use f i r e arms f o r t h e 
p r o t e c t i o n of t h e i r n a r c o t i c s and monies r e c e i v e d from t h e s a l e of 
n a r c o t i c s * Also a r e g i s t r a t i o n check of t h e house and v e h i c l e s shows 
t h e owner t o be a J e n a r o D a n i e l Romero whoj t h r o u g h a c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y 
c h e c k , ha s been a r r e s t e d f o r v a r i o u s f e l o o ^ f ^ h a r g e s ^ / R e g i s t r a t i o n checks 
of o t h e r v e h i c l e s f r e q u e n t i n g t h e resideppe JD£ 3^6/J G ^ n t Avenue r e v e a l e d 
t h e owners of some of t h e s a i d v e h i c l e s 
have been cha rged w i t h c r i m e s a s s o c i a t e 
w i t h t h e u s e of f i r e a r m s . 
ejr 
/4f«rT /*>*?*>** 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / ""' ,jay L d y of ^ 
IN THE C i r c u i t COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Jf6£/sf^ UG4& &///2Q 
I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that ' 
()J on the person(s) of A l l o c c u p a n t s o f 3460 G r a n t A v e n u e 
(>} on the premises known as 3460 G r a n t Avenue 
( ) in the vehicle(s) described as 
in the City of Ogden County of Weber, State of Utah, there is now being 
possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described as: 
Narcotics 
Records of the sales of Narcotics 
Monies from the sale of Narcotics 
Equipment used for the sale of Narcotics 
which property or evidence: 
(^ was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
(^ has been used or is possessed with the purpose of being used 
to commit or conceal the commission of an offense, 
( j j is evidence of illegal conduct. 
You are therefore commanded: 
ptt 
( ) in the daytime 
( j j at any time day or night 
(X) to execute without notice of authority or purpose 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), premises, and vehicle(s) for the herein-above 
described property or evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at 
the Circuit Court, County of Weber, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to order 
of this court. 
Given under my hand and dated th is . / ^ d a y o f ^ ^ , l 9 S 5 
State v. Romero 
Reply to Motion 
Criminal No. 19128 
Page Two 
examined at a forfeiture hearing and said report was found 
therein. The Terry Schmidt file was not examined for reports 
that defendant may be interested to see. This was brought out 
during the forfeiture hearing. 
rurtherf the state submits that defendant was not prejudiced 
by this inadvertent omission. Defendant claims that the fact 
that Terry Schmidt was seen by Shauna Mains in her report to 
enter "into a house that was yellow trim with red brick" is 
exculpatory because said description was not correct since 
defendant's home does not have yellow trim. However, a 
photograph was in evidence at the trial and Shauna Mains pointed 
out defendant's house as the one Terry Schmidt entered, came out 
of about fifteen minutes later and later handed her a bindle of 
cocaine. Also, Sgt. Gard testified he himself observed Terry 
Schmidt enter defendant's home; the same home that was searched 
the following day. Further, defendant himself testified that 
Terry Schmidt came by his house the day before the search. 
As to the second reason for defendant's motion of improper 
argument by the prosecutor, the state submits that the quoted 
lines of argument do not bear out defendant's contention of 
improper argument. 
As a matter of fact the State submits that the quoted lines 
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